Author: JMC Editor Last Edited: 12/1/2008 10:43:00 AM
The 2008 presidential election has made us think afresh about the proper place of popular and elite opinion in American politics. It isn’t the first time the questions have arisen, and it won’t be the last. How is public opinion created, detected, measured, and managed? How much weight should be given to the perspectives of candidates who claim to speak for non-elite voters, or embody non-elite attitudes? How much should a democracy be required to defer to the vox populi, and how much to the voice of expertise? And what do we do when our elites seem unwise or untrustworthy? Doesn’t a democracy empower its citizens to ask that impertinent question, “Says who?”
Such questions come up regularly, and have ever since the very beginnings of the American experiment. They have been a fixture of our national life since the days of Andrew Jackson, and have been the object of reflection for countless pundits and scholars. But no one had more to say about them than Walter Lippmann, one of the great American journalists of the twentieth century, and a man far less well known today than he should be.
Indeed, there is good reason to think that Lippmann's work may come to be seen as even more important and influential in the years to come. As Americans continue to struggle with the prospects and problems of their experiment in mass democracy, Lippmann's fearless criticism of modern American democracy may serve as an increasingly valuable intellectual touchstone in contemporary debate, where the disparaging term "elitist" has too often served as the ultimate trump card and conversation-stopper. Even if Francis Fukuyama had been right in asserting that all the ideological alternatives to liberal democracy in our time were exhausted—surely a temporary state of affairs, at most—an awareness of the pathologies of democracy suggests the a continuing need for frequent and sustained democratic self-criticism.
Although the gloomy and demythologized view of democracy found in Lippmann’s
The Phantom Public is hardly likely to convert mainstream American public opinion—such a development being unlikely virtually by definition—it preserves a serious and distinctive intellectual option, one with sympathetic resonances and precursors in the American past. The first epigraph of
The Phantom Public, questioning the wisdom of the adage
Vox populi, vox Dei, suggests an even more influential intellectual provenance: the antidemocratic skepticism of Alexander Hamilton, and the antidemotic fears of so many of the continental-minded men who drafted and campaigned for the U.S. Constitution.
Such historical continuity is not in itself a sufficient argument for Lippmann's importance. But the astonishing contemporary relevance of much of his work is. Sentences and paragraphs out of The Phantom Public could be lifted, unchanged, out of their context and be republished on the editorial pages of one of today's great American newspapers, where they might well win a Pulitzer for the plagiarist intrepid enough to appropriate them. (For instance, the book's first nine pages, which comprise a chapter entitled "The Disenchanted Man," can easily be mined for observations that seem to speak directly to the discontent of much of the current American electorate.) Moreover, Lippmann's cool, analytical acuity and complete eschewal of moral posturing should forestall any dismissive charge against him of self-interested elitism, moss-backed crankishness, or crypto-legitimism. As those who have read Public Opinion can attest, Lippmann's discussion of stereotypes and propaganda in the modern mass-communications media, written at a time when radio was in its infancy and television little more than a pipedream, has hardly been improved upon by eight decades' worth of subsequent writers, who had the advantage of observing those media in full operation.
The Phantom Public is arguably an even more valuable text, precisely because it was the clearest, pithiest, and most full-throated expression of Lippmann's crystallizing skepticism. Perhaps it was for that very reason that The Phantom Public disappeared from print so rapidly, and has remained so until now. Though it was acceptable, and even amusing, for a semicomic literary virtuoso like H.L. Mencken to mouth disdain for democracy and public opinion, such opinions were quite another matter coming from a man of Lippmann's reputed probity and wide influence. Lippmann himself came to suspect, before publication, that an untoward fate might lie in store for the book. Although he had written it as a shorter and more popularly aimed sequel to Public Opinion, which had enjoyed considerable intellectual and popular success, Lippmann worried that the more pointed and damning argument of The Phantom Public would get him in trouble, and even see him "put on trial for heresy by my old friends on The New Republic."
The [book's] argument, for all its bleakness, deserved a better hearing than it got.... [M]ost reviewers were disheartened by its seeming pessimism. The Phantom Public soon went out of print, and in the years since has been virtually forgotten. This neglect is unfortunate, for it is one of Lippmann's most powerfully argued and revealing books. In it he came fully to terms with the inadequacy of traditional democratic theory.
Indeed, no better testimony to the power and importance of The Phantom Public can be found than the seriousness and admiration with which it was read (and reviewed in the pages of the New Republic) by John Dewey, who was so stimulated by it that he went on to write one of his most ringing and durable defenses of democracy, The Public and Its Problems (1927), as an attempt at rebuttal. As it turns out, many of the contemporary reviews of The Phantom Public were unqualified raves, quite as favorable as Steel's retrospective one. Harold Lasswell enthused over its "cogent and spirited qualities." Another reviewer called it "a champion's performance" by a "dynamiter of fallacious doctrines of government and exploder of specious political arguments." Yet another proclaimed that The Phantom Public, like Public Opinion, “will become one of the modern classics of American political thought. And it is a book that will be read and reread for pure delight in its rare literary quality.”
The influential Senator William E. Borah, writing in the New York World, went so far as to call it "one of those rare books which startles one into a realization of how stupendous is the task before us as a people if we are to carry to a successful conclusion the work initiated in 1789." Given this degree of favorable reception, the mystery of The Phantom Public's phantom-like disappearance from public sight seems even harder to fathom. Perhaps the only plausible answer is the most obvious one: that the challenges it poses, and the implications of those challenges for the conduct of practical politics, have proved too unpleasant or difficult for even its most ardent admirers—or at any rate those less well-equipped than John Dewey—to face in a sustained manner.
It is not coincidental, then, that the debate with Dewey provides us a useful point of departure in exploring Lippmann's aims in writing The Phantom Public. No concept, after all, had been more central to the Progressive vision of social reform than that of "the public"; the efforts to tame special interests which so often animated Progressive reform were always undertaken in the name of "the public interest," and it was generally assumed that such a thing as the "pu